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I. INTRODUCTION
Today's society is one in which information is the most valuable
commodity. The crystallized, bipolar environment of political
ideologies, in which many of us grew up, no longer exists. In its
place we find an international community in which promotion of
cultural, ideological and political concepts occur not by force, but
through open and welcome exchange. Most relevant to this comment
is the fact that informational exchange is no longer restricted by the
once conventional means of communication: mail, telephone or
facsimile. The advent of the Internet allows for the access of
information in a medium that is instantaneous, globally permeating
and near perpetual in its existence.
While intrepid entrepreneurs and visionaries continue to forge the
commercial and social limits of the Internet frontier, it is the duty of
jurisprudence to delineate and decree what realms of this technology
shall remain forbidden. Such guidance is necessary to preserve basic
concepts of fairness and equity. As society becomes more dependent
on the exchange of information, entities that control access to the
same will find themselves wielding an awesome power, which has the
potential for immeasurable abuse if not held in check by the
appropriate authority.'
This comment will cover a host of interrelated topics in the
continually evolving field of Internet law and perhaps its biggest
quandary-domain name infringement. Domain names are the key to
accessing information on the Internet and to control this access is to
Literary great George Orwell realized the value of information-and its control: "Whoever
controls the past controls the future. Whoever controls the present controls the past."
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possess the aforementioned power. In the economic sense, the
perspective from which this comment is written, the possession of
such power can be. the key to a company's ability to achieve
commercial success and the source of curtailing consumers'
potentially endless buying power.
II. INTERNET FUNDAMENTALS
Like the overwhelming legal jargon that a first-year law student
must master in order to comprehend the material in a casebook, the
Internet, too, has its own lexicon that hinders analysis of relevant
legal issues. Proper understanding of the domain name infringement
issue and the remedial powers vested in the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (FTDA),2 the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act (ACPA)3 and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP)4 requires a basic understanding of some key Internet
concepts and related terminology.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, in American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno,5 provided
an excellent explanation of many Internet concepts in its
constitutional examination of the Communications Decency
Act. The Eastern District found that "[t]he Internet is not a physical
or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which interconnects
innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks. It is thus a
network of networks."6 While similar to an interconnecting web of
telephone networks, the Internet differs in that no single person or
commercial or government entity controls its operation.7 The Internet
"exists and functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands
of separate operators... independently decided to use common data
transfer protocols to exchange communications and information. ''s
While computers that are a part of the Internet may be owned by
individuals, businesses or the government, "[tlhe resulting whole is a
decentralized, global medium of communications . . . that links
people, institutions, corporations, and governments around the world.
215 U.S.CA § 1125(c) (West 2000).
315 U.S.C.A § 1125(d) (West 2000).
4 1NrmRr CORPORATION FOR ASSiGNED NAMIs AND NuMBERS (ICANN), Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 24, 1999), available at http:vww.icann.orgludrpudrp-
policy-24oct99.htm (last updated June 4, 2000) [hereinafter THE POLICY].
5Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
6 Id. at 830, 1.
7Id. at 832, 11.
8 aL
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The Internet is an international system." 9 The Internet can be equated
to a technological cooperative in which no entity reigns supreme and
where users interact with one another within a community of shared
data and information.
This matrix is organized so any computer that is a part of the
Internet can communicate with any other computer using a standard
rubric for data transmission and reception.10 Another element of this
communications medium, and perhaps the most widely known aspect
of the Internet, is the World Wide Web (Web). The Web is "a
collection of information resources contained in documents located on
individual computers around the world."" On the Web, Internet users
will find web pages, "interactive presentation[s] of data" that are
accessible to almost any computer.12 Web pages contain information
such as text, pictures, audio, video and links to other web pages.'
3
With a mode of communication-TCP/IP-and the content and
information that makes up the Internet-web pages-the only
component of the Internet that remains to be examined is a means to
access the information contained on the Internet. That means is not
only the key to unlocking the aforementioned wealth of information
on the Internet, but is also at the heart of domain name infringement
and is the subject that makes up the remaining content of this
comment.
Im. THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM: IP ADDRESSES AND DOMAIN
NAMES
The multitude of computers and their banks of information that
have become nodes in the tangled web of data on the Internet are each
identified via a series of numeric identifiers called an internet
protocol address, or IP address.14 IP addresses function similarly to a
9 1d. at 831, 4.
10 Transmission Control Protocol/Interet Protocol (TCP/IP) is the aforementioned rubric that
makes Internet communication possible. TCP breaks a file down into electronic packets while
IP routes the packets to their final destination. Once the packet reaches its destination, TCP
reassembles the individual packets into the complete file. See generally PAUL L. SCHLIEVE,
DEMYSIFYING TCP/IP (2d ed. 1997).
1 Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. \Vest Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir.
1999). See also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 835-36, 36 (E,D. Pa,
1996)
12Avery Dennison Corp. v. Jerry Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1999).
13 See Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1044. See also Am. Civil Liberties Union, 929 F.
Supp. at 836, 33.
14 Marcus J. Millet, Same Game in a New Domain-Some Trademark Issues on the Internet, 198
N.J. LAw. 32 (1999), microformed on N.J. LAw., Aug. 1999 (Heins Bar Jour. Serv.) (for
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street address or telephone number and tell the Internet user's
computer where to look for information on the Web. Each of these
strings of digits are unique; each section has its own meaning and is
part of the overall direction scheme that tells the computer where to
go. 5
But the use of an IP address, although the everyday language for a
computer, is a language that is nearly unintelligible to the average
Internet user. Therefore, a more user-friendly system of instructing a
computer where to look for information was developed. That system
consists of domains and domain names.
A domain is nothing more thad a collection of information that is
associated with one or more users.16  It follows, therefore, that a
domain name is a set of characters designating where a particular
domain is located. 17  Domain names function as mnemonic
designations of information. When entered into a user's web browser,
they automatically look up the corresponding IP address.1
8
Consequently, every web page has a corresponding domain name.
19
When a user seeks to place a web page and the information it
contains on the Internet, the user must register the domain and domain
name with a domain name registrar, such as Network Solutions, Inc.
(NSI).20 Registrars maintain a database of registrations and a system
for translating user-friendly domain names into a corresponding
computer-friendly IP address.2' While the user and the actual
computer might be speaking different languages (domain names
versus IP addresses), the registrar's domain name server acts as a
translator and takes the user to the correct location on the Web.22
example, an IP address might look like: 204.71.200.74; this particular address correlates with
<www.yahoo.com>).
15 See generally Chuck Semeria, Understanding IP Addressing. at
http.//www.3com.comnscI5Ol3O2s.html (Apr. 26, 1996).
16See Millet, supra note 14.
17id.
1" Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging La' of
Cybermarks, I RICH. J.L & TECH. 1, 12 (Apr. 10, 1995), arailable at
http'//wv.rihmond.edujoltfvlilburk.htmL
19 Panavision Int'l, LP. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).
20 Network Solutions, Inc. (http'J/www.networksolutions.com), is no longer the exclusive
registrar of domain names. For the <.com>, <net> and <.org> TLDs, a domain name registrant
could apply for registration with Register.Com (http-/Avwwv.register.com) or Internet Names
WorldWide (http://vww.inww.com) among others. A complete list of all licensed domain name
registrars and the TLDs they service is available at http'Jlvww.norid.nodomreg.html (last
updated May 18, 1999).
21See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 869, 872 (9th Cir. 1999).
"See Millet, supra note 14, at 33. See also Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63
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To translate a domain name into its corresponding IP address, the
user must employ a web browser's uniform resource locator (URL).
The URL refers to a set of characters that specify the location of a
particular item of information and includes the domain name as well
as additional information regarding the particulars of the information
within the domain.23 The URL acts as the "global address of
documents and other resources of the World Wide Web."24  For
example, in the URL http://www.scu.edu, the 'http' section tells the
computer which protocol 5 to use while <www.scu.edu> directs the
computer to the proper domain name/IP address in order to locate the
desired information.26
Like an IP address, domain names contain multiple fields of
information. With the aforementioned example of <wvww.scu.edu>,
<.edu> is the top-level domain (TLD). A number of TLDs exist on
the Web, such as the aforementioned <.edu> for educational
institutions, <.gov> for United States government agencies and
institutions, <.com> for commercial use, <.org> for not-for-profit
organizations, <.mil> for the United States military and <.net> for
network organizations. 27 Several country-coded TLDs (ccTLDs) such
as <.ca> (Canada), <.th> (Thailand) and <.uk> (the United Kingdom)
also exist.28 However, especially during the infancy of the Web and
NSI's monopoly over the <.com> TLD, there was minimal scrutiny
regarding the registration of TLDs to the proper class of requesting
entity, which has contributed to the current infringement problem. 20
Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 10, 1998) (the domain name system translates Internet namnes into the IP
numbers needed for transmission of information across the network).
2 See Millet, supra note 14, at 33.
24 Webopedia: Online Computer Dictionary for Internet Terms and Technical Support, at
http.//webopedia.intemet.com/TERMfU/URL.html (last modified June 24, 1998).
25Protocol is the format for transmitting data between two devices. The protocol informs the
computer what "language" to speak with the other computer in order to properly request and
receive the desired data. Protocols also determine methods of error checking in the transmission
of data and means of data compression. Another important function of protocol is its
determination of how the sending source will indicate it has finished transmitting data and the
receiving source's indication of successfiul acquisition of that data. Webopedia: Online
Computer Dictionary for Internet Terms and Technical Support, at
http:llwebopedia.intemetcomlterm/p/protocol.html (last modified Sept. 01, 1996),
26 See Webopedia: Online Computer Dictionary for Internet Terms and Technical Support, at
http://webopedia.intemet.com/TERMf/UIRL.html (last modified June 24, 1998).
27 Webopedia: Online Computer Dictionary for Internet Terms and Technical Support, at
http://webopedia.intemet.com/TERM/TTLD.html (last modified Jan. 4,2001).
28Id.
29 It is not unusual to find, for example, a commercial institution with a <.org or <.Cdu> TLD.
The TLDs most commonly misapplied are <.com>, <.net>, <.org> and <.edu>. There is a great
deal of scrutiny, however, in the registration of <.mil> and <.gov> TLDs. Allyn Taylor,
2001] DOMAIN NAME LITIGATION, THEACPA & UDRP 321
While improper TLD/registrant pairing is a problem, the core of
the domain name infiingement problem results from misapplying
second-level domain names (SLDs). The SLD often describes the
actual name of the entity hosting the web site or gives some indication
as to the nature of the site. In the URL http://www.CNN.com,
<http://> is, again, the protocol designation, <.com> is the TLD and
'CNN' is the SLD. The SLD has the potential to indicate to the user
that it is accessing a site hosted by the news service CNN. Likewise,
with http://www.volkswagen.com, the SLD indicates that a user is
accessing a site operated by the car manufacturer Volkswagen. In
many cases, as with these two examples, the SLD of a domain name
is the trademark of the entity operating the site. It is the use of
trademarks as SLDs that has led to the problem of domain name
infringement.
IV. GETTING STUCK IN THE WEB: DOMAiN NAME REGISTRATION
For an individual or entity to obtain a domain name, the registrant
files an application with a licensed domain name registrar such as NSI
or Register.corn indicating the SLDITLD combination the applicant
desires.30 Since each web site must have a unique domain name, the
registrar checks the availability of the requested domain name.31 If
another party previously registered a desired SLD/TLD, the registrant
must choose a different combination. 2  Other than requiring
applicants to make certain representations regarding their contact
information, registrars do not make exhaustive-if any-
Address at Santa Clam University School of Law (Dec. 3, 1999) (speaking on domain names
and the challenge they present to trademark lav). See also Webopcdia: Online Computer
Dictionary for Internet Terms and Technical Support, at
http'./lwebopedia.intemet.comfTERl/TfrLD.html (last modified Jan. 4, 2001). with the
commercial potential of the Internet, competition for domain names has become fierce. For
example, of all the companies named 'Acme, Inc.,' only one can have the domain name
<www.acme.com>. The ICANN Board recently approved seven new TLDs to help alleviate
this situation. See infra note 286.
30 Both NSI and Register.com offer extremely simple application forms where the user indicates
the desired domain name, contact information and the length of registration. Both sites took less
than five minutes to register a domain name. Network Solutions, at http:IAvww.nsi.com (last
visited Apr. 25, 2001); Register.com, at http'J/wwv.register.com (last visited Apr. 25,2001).
31 With both NSI and Register.com, this is the first step following indication of a desired domain
name. If the name is not available, the registrar suggests registration in another TLD or a slight
variation to the SLD. Id.
32 For example, if a registrant applies for <wvww.X.com> and discovers prior assignment, he
might attempt <wwwv.X.org> or <www.X.net>. The TLD may not properly correspond to the
web site's function (i.e., <wwwv.X.org> for an electronic commerce site; <.org>, generally, is
reserved for not-for-profit groups), but notwithstanding the misdescription, registration remains
permissible.
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determinations into a registrant's legal right to use a particular
SLD/TLD combination with regard to potential infringement of
otherwise properly registered trademarks.33
Further contributing to the domain name infringement problem is
the conveyance of domain names on a first-come, first-served basis.
34
Such a practice provides unethical parties-cybersquatters-an
incentive to beat out a rightful trademark holder in the registration
process so they may hold the domain name hostage and demand
compensation from the trademark holder.35
Notwithstanding the present unethical behavior of cybersquatters,
the seeds of the registration problem were sown more than twenty-
five years ago when the Department of Defense's Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) funded research for the transmission of
electronic data through packet-switching technology-the foundation
of Internet communication. 36  Using this new packet-switching
technology, DARPA assisted in the creation of an elementary network
of computers that represented a microcosm of what the Internet would
become.37
When the scale of this proto-Internet (called ARPANET) was, at
33 Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir,
1999). Since the implementation of the UDRP, however, a registrant "represent[s] and
warrant[s] ... that.., the registration of the domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise
violate the rights of any third party." THE POLICY, supra note 4, 2. Furthermore, the
provisions of the UDRP-including the aforementioned warranty-are "incorporated by
reference into [the] Registration Agreement" for any domain name. THE POLICY, supra note 4,
1. Therefore, any new registration or subsequent re-registrations of previously registered
domain names are all subject to the UDRP.
m While the warranties of the UDRP apply to all registrants, neither registrar had any procedural
safeguards in place to ensure that the registrant was who he claimed to be and that he had any
rights in the domain name sought. Registrars have little reason to make such an investigation or
determination as they are, for the most part, immune to suit under the ACPA per Section
1125(d)(2)(D)(ii), which states that "[t]he domain name registrar or registry ... shall not be
liable ... except in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard." The UDRP, per Rule
3(b)(xiv)(b), likewise waives all liability against the registry. INTERNET CORPORATION FOR
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN), Rules for Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct.
24, 1999), at http:llwww.icann.orgludrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.html (last modified Jan. 3, 2000)
[hereinafter THE RULES]. Liability for a registrar is equally as questionable under the FTDA, as
"NSI's limited role as a registrar... coupled with the inherent uncertainty in defining the scope
of intellectual property rights in a trademark militates against finding that NSI knew or has
reason to know of potentially infringing uses by others." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
35 Millet, supra note 14. Cybersquatters are those who "appropriate brand names with the sole
intent of extorting money from the lawful mark owner." 145 CONG. REC. S9,744, 9,750
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
36 Management of Intemet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,741 (June 10, 1998).
371d.
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the time, quite small, a graduate student at the University of
California at Los Angeles, Dr. Jon Postel, single-handedly undertook
the maintenance of tracking IP addresses, much like domain name
registrars do today.38 As the network and lists grew, DARPA
permitted Dr. Postel to delegate some of his administrative functions
to a group known as SRI International, a Department of Defense
contractor.3 9 As growth continued, an entity known as the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority, later known as the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), took on performance of
the tasks previously handled by Dr. Postel and SRI.
40
Tracking registration proved to be incredibly taxing and on July
1, 1997, as part of the Clinton Administration's Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce, the Secretary of Commerce privatized
the management of the domain name system in order to increase
competition and facilitate international participation in its
management.41 As part of that agreement, five companies were
chosen to participate in a competitive shared registry for the <.com>,
<.net> and <.org> TLDs. 42  The agreement marked "a major
milestone in the joint efforts of the public and private sectors to bring
Internet users the benefits of real competition in registration services
in the most popular Internet domains. ' 43 The agreement also opened
the door to domain name infringement as bottom-line profits became
more paramount to orderly and consistent registration requirements.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING DOMAIN NAME
INFRINGEMENT
A critical question is whether domain name infringement is
worthy of the attention, much less federal legislation and international
arbitration. According to one legal scholar, "[i]n the information age,






41 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Dep't of Commerce and Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (on file with author).
42 ICANN Press Release, ICANN Names Competitive Domain-Name Rfgtstrars (Apr. 21, 1999)
(on file with author). The five registrars named to participate in the program were America
Online, CORE (Internet Council of Registrars), France Telecom!Olane, Melbourne IT and
Register.Com. Before that, registration services in the <.com>, <.net> and <.org> domains were
provided by Network Solutions, Inc., who had enjoyed an exclusive right to handle registrations,
under a 1993 Cooperative Agreement with the United States Government.43Id. (quoting Esther Dyson, Interim Chairperson of ICANN).
44 See Millet, supra note 14.
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Business today thrives on the Internet and electronic commerce more
than ever before.45 Despite the recent swoon in the Internet industry,
a number of businesses continue to sell their products exclusively on
the Internet-Amazon.com and eBay.com, for example.46 Other
businesses may not sell their products directly over the Internet, like
the earlier example of <volkswagen.com>, but use the Web as a
cheap and effective means of advertising and providing instantaneous
information about their products and where they can be purchased.
But what should happen if a business finds its trademark is
unavailable as a domain name for use on the Internet or its domain
name is confused with another domain or is significantly diluted by
another party? Consider this dilemma with the fact that the Internet,
in 1990, had less than one million users worldwide.4 7 Ten short years
later, the Internet has become an integral part of everyday
communications and commerce, with over 100 million users now on-
line.48  The entire world is slowly, but surely, getting on-line. To
hinder the ability of an entity to use the Internet for commerce is to
pose a "very serious threat to consumers and the future growth of
electronic commerce.
' 9
Domain name infringement poses a threat to the most basic
objectives of trademark law: "reducing the customer's costs of
shopping and making purchasing decisions. ' 5 Trademarks permit a
purchaser to quickly and easily ascertain the quality, history and
dependability of an item displaying a trusted trademark. If a
consumer purchased item X bearing a certain trademark and benefited
from that purchase, that consumer is likely to feel comfortable in the
45 In 1999, on-line commercial sales were estimated to have reached $18 billion, John
McCormick, The Internet 500: Deep Well, Interactive Week (citing Forrester Research), at
http:lvww.zdnet.comlintweek/storieslnews/0,4164,2394349,00.html (Nov. 15, 1999).
46 See generally Joseph Gallivan, Dot-Corn's Death, NEv YORK POST, Nov. 9, 2000 (providing
a brief, but concrete, overview of the collapsing dot-corn marketplace), at
http://www.nypost.com/11092000/business/15296.htm.
47 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG. (WIPO), FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO DOMAIN
NAME PROCESS: THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES/INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IssuES 166, available at http.//wipo2.wipo.int./processl/report/index.html (Apr.
30, 1999); see also Amer. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831, 3 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
48 See Millet, supra note 14. See also Ani. Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp, at 831, 3; 145
CONG. REc. S10,305 (Aug. 5, 1999) ("Ten million customers shopped for some product using
the Internet in 1998 alone. ... 5.3 million households will have access to financial transactions
like banking and stock trading by the end of 1999.").
41 145 CONG. REC. S14,985, 15,019 (Nov. 19, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
50 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. Vest Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995)).
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purchase of item Y bearing the same mark in the future. The law, in
this manner, "helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards
associated with a desirable product."5' Domain name infringement-
cybersquatting or otherwise-upsets these elementary premises of
consumer protection by allowing unscrupulous competitors to free-
ride on the mark holder's good will and reputation.
VI. DOMAIN NAME INFRINGEMENT AND PRE-ACPA/UDRP
TRADEMARK LITIGATION
A. The Likelihood of Confiision and Domain Name
Infringerment
In many cases, Internet users know exactly where they are going
on the Web and enter the URL of the desired web site. Occasionally,
a user does not know the complete URL of a web site and makes an
educated guess by entering the trademark of a company followed by a
<.com>-<trademark.com>. This approach is often successful as
many web sites use their trademark as an SLD 2 Companies that
market on the Internet intentionally seek "to make the search for their
web site as easy as possible. They do so by using a corporate name,
trademark, or service mark as their web site address."
53
But what happens when an Internet user looks for a web site
using the trademark of a company and instead finds a totally unrelated
service? For example, if an Internet user types in the URL
<www.whitehouse.com>, the user might reasonably expect to find a
web site about the presidential residence at 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue. In fact, the URL reveals a pornographic web site. While the
actual URL is <wwwv.whitehouse.gov>, the user's mistake in typing
the incorrect URL is an honest and conceivable one. The Internet
user could try again with the assistance of a search engine or the user
could become frustrated and give up the search.m One can only begin
to imagine the commercial losses suffered from frustrated Internet
users giving up their search for a product or service.
5"Id. (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64).
5See Playboy Enters. v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-6961, 1998 WL 767440, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1998); see also Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741
(E.D. Va. 1997), aji'd, 129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir.1997).
5See Panavision Int'l, LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998); sce also Bcverly v.
Network Solutions, Inc., No. C-98-0337-VRNV, 1998 WL 320829, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 12,
1998).
'4See infra note 60.
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A domain name serves as more than a part of the domain name/IP
address dichotomy because "[a] significant purpose of the domain
name is to identify the entity that owns the Web site.""5 This premise
is in perfect harmony with the aforementioned <trademark.com>
logic. A domain name that is identical to a company's well-known
trademark "may be a valuable corporate asset, as it facilitates
communication with a customer base."56 The domain name, in the
world of electronic commerce, serves not only as a means of
accessing a web site without entering a complicated IP address, but
also serves as an indicia of quality as to the web site's information or
commercial product.
5 7
When consumers purchase a product with a certain trademark on
the packaging, they know they are purchasing a product of a certain
quality and dependability based on their experiences with other goods
bearing the same trademark. 8 While information regarding quality
and dependability may not appear on the packaging, the trademark
conveys all of this informationi 9 The same theory carries over to a
domain name and the communicative value of that name.
When Internet users access <amazon.com>, they know they are
accessing a tried and proven electronic commerce site that sells
millions of books that can be reviewed and purchased with a user-
friendly interface without ever leaving home. The domain name of
<amazon.com> is thus much more than a device for avoiding the
entry of a complicated IP address as it also tells the user the history,
quality and dependability of the web site and its services.
5Spanavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1327.
16 MTV Networks, Inc. v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202,203-04 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).57 See Peter Brown, New Issues in Internet Litigation, 471 PRAC. L. INST. 151, 156 (1997). See
also Indus. Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 303 U.S. 640 (1937) ("[A] trademark is ... a word or symbol indicating the origin of a
commercial product.").
58 The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of
symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by
them. A trademark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what
he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a trademark exploits
this human propensity by making every human effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the
market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,205 (1942).
59 Brand names and trademarks become associated with expectations of a particular quality.
Reputations based on consistent past performance economize on the costs of information
about the anticipated performance of a good. Thus consumers will sensibly use the brand
name or reputation of the maker as a basis for choice.
A. ALCHIAN & W.R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION,
AND CONTROL 193 (2d ed. 1977).
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Of greater concern is what occurs when a party misappropriates
an entity's trademark for use as its own domain name and provides a
similar or competing good of the actual trademark holder. When
Internet users enter a URL under the <trademark.com> theory and
happen upon a different site than they set out to find, there is a
possibility the users will "fail to continue to search for [the correct]
home page.,, 60 This failure to continue the search may be "due to
anger, frustration or the belief. . . [that the desired site] does not
exist.''61  Not only has the owner of the misappropriated
trademark/domain name perhaps lost a sale, the competitor perhaps
gained a consumer for the present purchase, and possibly the future,
at the expense of the owner of the misappropriated trademark.
This scenario became reality in Brookfield Communications, Inc.
v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.62 The plaintiff, Brook-field
Communications, attempted to register the domain name
<moviebuff.com>-the name of its searchable movie database
software. The domain name registrar denied Brookfield's application
when the registrar discovered that the desired domain name was
assigned to the defendant, West Coast Entertainment.63 Not only was
Brookfield's desired name unavailable, it was in use by a competitor
using it for on-line movie sales!
While the similarity of trademarks and domain names does not
necessarily lead to per se consumer confusion, as there must be
consideration of the relatedness of the products or services offered,
64
the similarity of the products in Brookfield Communications-
Brookfield's "Movie Buff" movie database software and West
Coast's on-line site for movie sales at <moviebuff.com>-led the
court to conclude that Internet users might confuse the plaintiffs
database with the defendant's web site.65 In that conclusion, the court
reiterated the lost customer scenario whereas "West Coast will have
gained a customer by misappropriating the goodwill that Brookfield
60 Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 306-07 (D.NJ. 1998) (Techner, J., quoting
Wood, J., in Planned Parenthood v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); secalso
Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (explaining that the seemingly endless list of potential sites found on a search engine
might deter Internet users from searching for a particular web site).
6 1Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. 282,306-07.
6Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
63See generally d. at 1042.
Id. at 1055.
6'1d at 1057.
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had developed in its 'MovieBuff [data base] mark. 66
The test for the likelihood of confusion was better evidenced in
Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc67(Clue Computing II) where the
plaintiff, the maker of the board game Clue, sought an injunction
against Clue Computing, Inc., for operating a web site with the
domain name <clue.com>. The court reiterated the importance of
preventing use of a mark similar to that used by another party in such
a way that the public would become confused about the actual source
of goods or services. 68 "Such confusion might prevent the buyer from
obtaining the goods he seeks or may endanger the reputation of the
first user of the mark by association with the second user."
69
The Clue Computing II court employed a multi-step analysis that
sought to establish whether a substantial likelihood of confusion
exists.70 While the court found the marks similar (<clue.com>, the
domain name versus Clue, the game), the environment in which the
marks operated (computing versus board games) favored a finding of
no confusion in the end analysis.7' The court additionally saw little
similarity in the channels of trade and advertising and further found
that the sophistication of the customers would likely prevent anan
confusion as to the application of the mark as a domain name.
Strengthening this proposition was the fact that there was minimal
proof of actual confusion and no evidence that the defendant sought
to infringe upon the goodwill of the Clue board game.73 CIe
Computing II evidences the principle that because a trademark holder
66id.
67 Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc. (Clue Computing 1), 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. Sept.
1999), affid, 232 F.3d I (Ist Cir. 2000).
68 Clue Computing II, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (quoting Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Aastar Mortgage
Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1996)).
69 DeCosta v. Viacom, Int'l, 981 F.2d 602, 605 (Ist Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 923
(1993).
70 Those factors were: (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the similarity of the goods or services,
(3) the relationship between the parties' channels of trade, (4) the relationship between the
parties' advertising, (5) the sophistication or classes of prospective purchasers, (6) evidence of
actual confusion, (7) the defendant's intent in adopting the mark and (8) the strength of the
plaintiff's mark. See Star Fin. Servs., 89 F.3d at 10-11. The First Circuit deemed this analysis
the Star Test as it came from the Star. Fin. Servs. holding. Various circuits have adopted similar
tests, under different names: the SquirtCo. Test in the Eighth Circuit, see SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up
Co., 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980); the Sleekcraft Test in the Ninth Circuit, see E& Gallo
Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1992) and the Roto-Rooter Test in the Fifth
Circuit, see Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisermann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1986).
71 Clue Computing1I, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 122-23, 126.
72 1d. at 123.
731d. at 124-25.
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has established rights in a mark, accompanying rights are not
automatically created in a domain name. 4
B. Trademark Dilution and Domain Name Infringement
Before passage of the ACPA and the likelihood of confusion
cause of action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,75 there existed
a second, and more popular, cause of action to address alleged
misappropriation of a trademark as a domain name. Such claims fell
under Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act-the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act.76 While the FTDA was enacted to provide "owner[s] of
a famous mark" injunctive relief "against another person's
commercial use of a mark or trade name ...after the mark has
become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark, 77 it was also seen as a tool to combat cybersquatting in the
early days of the epidemic.
78
Dilution is "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence
or absence of competition between the owner of the famous mark and
other parties, or likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception."7' For
example, in Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, the court held
that the registration of another's trademark as a domain name
"diminished the capacity of the [infringed] marks to identify and
distinguish [the infringed party's] goods and services on the
Internet."80 Despite the fact that <panavision.com> was not soliciting
the goods or services of another party, the actual owner of the mark-
Panavision-was unable to associate the Panavision domain name
with Panavision's goods and services. The result, in the eyes of the
74 See Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Ore. 1997) (finding that
trademarks do not constitute a monopoly of the name or mark used).
75 Clue Computing I, 66 F. Supp. 2d 117.
76 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 2000).
7id.
78211 CONG. REC. S19,312-01 (Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
79 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 2000). Blurring occurs when a defendant uses the plaintiffs
trademark to identify the defendant's goods or services, creating the possibility that the mark
will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiffs product. See Ringling
Bros.-Bamurn & Bailey, Combined Shows v. B.E. Windows, Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 209
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Tarnishment, on the other hand, occurs when a famous mark is improperly associated with an
inferior or offensive product or service thereby causing the good name associated with the
trademark to be tarnished. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods. 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d
Cir. 1996).
80 Panavision Int'l, LPv.Toeppen 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1999);see also Intermatic, Inc.
v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1240 (N.D. III. 1996).
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court, was a lessening of the impact and power of the Panavision
mark in the mind of the consumer.81
In Archdiocese of St. Louis and Papal Visit v. Internet
Entertainment Group, Inc.,82 a preliminary injunction stretched the
limits of the FTDA and the Panavision International holding when it
enjoined the defendant's use of the domain names <papalvisit.com>
and <papalvisit1999.com> per the SLDs' legal status as common law
trademarks.8 3 The court granted the injunction upon a finding that the
defendant had "been diluting the distinctiveness of the plaintiff's
family of marks by using the name 'papal visit 1999' and derivatives
thereof to identify a sexually explicit Internet site."84 Association of
these marks with adult entertainment venues was thought to be
"inconsistent with the positive and spiritual uplifting image plaintiff[]
[has] striven to create and maintain in connection with the Pope's...
visit to St. Louis. ' 85
While courts tend to find in favor of the trademark holder, as
shown in the extreme case of Archdiocese of St. Louis, there are limits
to the tarnishment theory of trademark/domain name use. This
limitation is a result of the First Amendment's preemptory protection
of speech and expression. In Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v.
Faber,86  the defendant registered the domain name
<www.compupix.com>, but also included as a subdivision of the
URL, </ballysucks>.87 Bally alleged that the subdivision of the URL,
</ballysucks>, confused Internet users looking for the Bally Total
Fitness web site and diluted their famous mark.88 The court disagreed
and found there to be no act of infringement under a likelihood of
confusion model.89
81 Panavision Int'l, 141. F.3d at 1327. But see supra note 74 (finding that trademarks do not
constitute a monopoly of the name or mark used).
2Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Entm't Group, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (E.D. Mo. 1999).




86 Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal, 1998).87 Id. at 1162. The complete URL would read: http://www.compupix.com/ballysucks.
"
8 Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
89 First, the defendant did not use the Bally name as his primary SLD but in a lower-level SLD.
Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165. Second, there would be no user frustration in a
search for the actual Bally's site under the <trademark.com> theory as, again, the defendant was
not using the Bally name as part of his primary SLD. Finally, the Court found that "no
reasonably prudent Internet user would believe that 'Ballysucks.com' is the official Bally site or
is sponsored by Bally. Id. at n.2.
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More importantly, the Bally Total Fitness court refused to find
dilution under the FTDA because of the aforementioned First
Amendment concerns. To Bally's dismay, the court found that the
mere use of another party's trademark as a part of a domain name on
the Internet did not equate to per se commercial use.90 When the
FTDA was penned, it was done so with its authors being well aware
that free speech, fair use, opinion and commentary must be allowed to
continue unabated.91 Such was the case with Bally Total Fitness, as
the defendant did not use the Bally mark to sell a service or product
but rather to express his displeasure with Bally Total Fitness health
clubs. The court was clear in holding that "trademark owners may
not quash unauthorized use of the mark by a person expressing a point
of view.
' 92
The Ninth Circuit, however, created a glaring conflict in the
interpretation of trademark dilution and domain names in Avery
Dennison Corp. v. Jerry Sumpton.93 In Avety Dennison, the court
found that the defendant's appropriation of 'Avery' and 'Dennison'-
both registered trademarks of the plaintiff-as domain names was not
an act of dilution because the defendant registered the domain names
under the TLD <.net> as opposed to <.com>.94 The Ninth Circuit felt
that previous decisions regarding domain names and trademark
dilution "considered tradmark.com registrations" and not those of
another TLD such as <.net> or <.edu>.9" The court went on to
blatantly state that "dilution does not occur with a trademark.net
9
'Ball, Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 (quoting 3 JOSEPH T. MCCARTiY, MCCARTHy O'
TRADaARKs AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:97.2, 24-172 (4th ed. 1996). Cf. Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (noting that if a communication's dominant
theme is to propose a commercial transaction, then it is commercial speech and is not afforded
the same broad protections offered by the First Amendment of the Constitution).
"' Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) specifically noted these precepts during congressional hearings
on the dilution acts. Hatch felt the dilution statute would "not prohibit or threaten
noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other forms of expression that
are not a part of a commercial transaction." See 141 CONG. REc. S38,559 (Dec. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
92 See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26, 29 (st Cir. 1987) (quoting Lucasfilm,
Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931,933-35 (D.D.C. 1985); see also RESTATE-ENr (THRD)
OF UNFAIR CompErmoN § 25(2) cmt. i (1995) ('[e]xtension of the anti-dilution statute to
protect against damaging non-trademark uses raises substantial fre speech issues .... ."). Cf.
Lucent Techs. v. Johnson, 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1637, 1639-40 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that the use
of 'yourcompanysucks' as a domain name does not equate to per se First Amendment safe
harbor in trademark litigation).
93 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Jerry Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
9HId. at 880-81.
951d. at 880.
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registration., 96  Numerous other cases have come to the opposite
conclusion.
97
Despite the glaring contradictions of FTDA decisions involving
domain names and the overextension of rights that were granted in
cases such as Archdiocese of St. Louis, the FTDA was drafted with a
certain amount of intent that it actually be used for combating domain
name infringement. Senator Patrick Leahy felt that the "anti-dilution
statute [would] help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses
taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the
products and reputations of others. 98 Unfortunately, jurisprudence is
not founded on the concept of good intent and the FTDA was, in fact,
misconstrued and overextended on numerous occasions that lead to
conflicts in application of the law, judicial activism in the application
of the law and the cry for new legislation drafted specifically to deal
with cybersquatters and domain name infringement.
99
Use of the FTDA as a cybersquatting remedy is not without its
problems and sometimes creative judicial solutions. Referring again
to Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, after Panavision
discovered Toeppen had already registered the sought after domain
name, Panavision contacted Toeppen only to have him demand
$13,000 for its surrender. Panavision refused to be extorted and filed
6 Id. at 881.
97See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1055 (9th
Cir. 1999) (observing that the differences between the mark 'MovieBuff' and the domain name
<moviebuff.com> are "inconsequential in light of the fact that Web addresses are not caps-
sensitive and that the '.com' top-level domain signifies the site's commercial nature."); see also
Shade's Landing, Inc. v. Williams, 76 F. Supp. 2d 983, 990 (D. Minn. 1999) ("[Bjecause all
domain names include one of these extensions, the distinction between a domain name ending
with '.com' and the same name ending with '.net' is not highly significant.").
98 141 CoNG. REc. S38,561 (Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
The FTDA was originally to be applied only in cases where "use of another's trademark as a
domain name is deceptive or intentional". Hasbro Inc. v. Clue Computing (Clue Computing I1),
66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 133 (D. Mass. 1999). This would conform with the traditional requirements
of dilution where a trademark/domain name has been utilized in an "unwholesome manner or
for a low quality product which could create a negative association." Id. at 133; see also Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,205 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding
dilution of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders' trademarked uniforms when they appeared as
costumes in a pornographic movie). Likewise, "[n]ot every use of a similar mark will blur a
famous mark" as the human mind is capable of recognizing a "multiplicity of concepts, ideas
and images without confusion or association." Ringling Bros.-Barmum & Bailey v. Utah Dlv.
Of Travel & Dev., 955 F. Supp 605, 614 (E.D. Va. 1997). This premise directly contradicts the
Panavision Int7 holding. Trademark treatise author, J. Thomas McCarthy, sides with Ringling
Brothers in finding that "[the dilution doctrine in its 'blurring' mode cannot and should not be
carried to the extreme of forbidding the use of every trademark on any and all products and
services . . . . 4 JOSEPH T. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COmETmON § 24:117, 24-250 (4th ed. 1996).
2001] DOMAIN NAME LITIGATION, THEACPA & UDRP 333
suit for violations of the FTDA.100 A cause of action under the FTDA
is made up of four constituent elements: (1) a famous mark (2) being
commercially misappropriated (3) by another (4) with such use
occurring after the mark has become famous.' 0 ' In addition, that use
must be diluting the quality of the mark in its ability to distinguish
and identify goods and services. 02 While there is little question
regarding the famousness of the 'Panavision' trademark and the
timing of the use, the court found itself challenged in fulfilling the
remaining two elements-commercial use and actual dilution.
03
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, in an example of judicial activism, addressed the commercial
issue by finding the actual act of cybersquatting to constitute use in
commerce as required by the FTDA.1°4 The business objective of a
cybersquatter being "to profit by the resale or licensing of these
domain names ... to the entities who conduct business under these
names," the Northern District considered this activity commercial in
nature.105  In an equally innovative manner, the Northern District
found market exclusion to constitute dilution as opposed to traditional
definitions of blurring and tamishment10 6 The conduct of Toeppen
diminished "the capacity of the Panavision marks to identify and
distinguish Panavision's goods and services on the Intemet."'0 7
VII. THE JURISDIcTIoNAL DEBACLE OF THE INTERNET AND ITS
EFFECT ON DoMAiN NAME INFRINGEMENT
The common difficulty in many early domain name cases was
that of establishing personal jurisdiction over the alleged infringing
party. Ironically, cases like Burger King'"5 and Asahi Metal
Industries Co.,'0 9 decided long before the advent of the Internet,
continue to provide guidance in maneuvering the personal jurisdiction
'OoSee generally Panavision Int'l, LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1316, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1999).
'o 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c) (West 2000).
102id.
1o3 Recall there was no actual intent to dilute the Panavision mark, nor was there use in
commerce to proffer a product or service.
lo" The commercial business of a cybersquatter is to "register trademarks as domain names and
then sell them to the rightful trademark onmers." Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1325.
105 Id (quoting Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen. 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (N.D. IlL 1996)).
'06Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d. at 1326.
'071d.; see also Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1240.
logBurger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
109Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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quandary of the Intemet." As this comment goes to press, however,
there has been no Supreme Court decision that has unified the
menagerie of conflicting circuit court opinions on the personal
jurisdiction question. The larger difficulty with these conflicting
opinions is that multiple standards of jurisdiction apply to one
internationally accessible service. While the Internet may provide the
gateway to commercial riches, it comes with the caveat that one never
knows where they may be haled into court."'
While state authority confers the exercise of personal jurisdiction,
the extent of that authority falls under the governance of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 112  Traditionally, the
plaintiff would have to rely on a state's long arm jurisdiction statute
(LAJS). 113  The due process limitations on the exercise of power
conferred in a state's LAJS would differ depending upon the type of
jurisdiction a court sought to exercise over a non-resident
defendant-general or specific."
14
General jurisdiction exists when "the number and quality of the
defendant's contacts with the forum-state are sufficiently substantial
that one may litigate any dispute in the courts of the forum, whether
'10 Ironically, today's jurisdictional issues were prophesized half a century ago in Hanson v.
Denckla, "[a]s technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the
need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase." Hanson v. Denekla,
357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958). This prediction was reiterated in Burger King Corp. for it is a
"fact of modem commercial life that a substantial amount of commercial business is transacted
solely by mail and wire communications . . . thus obviating the need for physical presence
within a State .... Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
1n See, e.g., Nora Macoluso, Yahoo! Rejects French Authority in Nazi Dispute, lit
http:lvww.newsfactor.comlperllstory/6262.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2001). Suit was filed in
France, against Yahoo!, for making Nazi-related content available for auction on its web site,
France has laws in place that prohibit the exhibition or sale of Nazi-related objects. Greg
Wrenn, legal counsel for Yahoo!, refused to recognize the French court's jurisdiction over this
matter and maintains Yahoo! will not pay the fines unless the judgment is enforced by a U.S.
court because Yahoo.com is located within the U.S., it can only be governed by American laws,
laws that protect such Nazi-related speech under the First Amendment. Yahool also objects to
the technical complications in filtering out such material so that it is not accessible to users in
France.
1
2Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
113 Such statutes allow a resident plaintiff to extend personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant. For example, the state of Pennsylvania's LAJS, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5322(a)(2) (West 2000), permits jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when said
defendant contracts to "supply services or things in [the] Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania]."
The LAJS of the State of New York, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2) (McKinney 2001), permits
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary who "commits a tortious act within the state .... "
114 See, e.g., Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir.
1992).
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or not that dispute grows out of those contacts."" 5  Specific
jurisdiction, on the other hand, exists when "the commission of some
single or occasional act[s] ... in a state... because of [its] nature and
quality and the circumstances of [its] commission, may be deemed
sufficient to render the [entity] liable to suit."
1 6
The minimum contacts required for specific jurisdiction involve
an analysis of the legal sufficiency of a specific set of interactions.'
1 7
First, the claim underlying the litigation must directly arise out of, or
relate to, the defendant's forum-state activities." 8  Second, the
defendant's contact with the forum-state must represent purposeful
availnent, thereby invoking the benefits of that state's law.l1
Finally, the exercise ofjurisdiction must befair and reasonable.120
The first part of the aforementioned analysis requires that the
claim raised by the plaintiff must arise directly from the defendant's
alleged contact with the forum-state.'21 In Clue Computing I, for
example, the plaintiff brought a trademark infringement claim
concerning a web site that was continuously available to
Massachusetts consumers and caused tortious injury to Massachusetts
resident Hasbro. Clue Computing I found that advertising on the
Internet in the forum-state satisfied the initial inquiry of
relatedness. 122
The second element, purposeful availment, was articulated in
Asahi.'23 Purposeful availment requires that the defendant's contact
with the forum-state "not be due to happenstance."'2 4  Such a
"5 See generally Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
116 IntI Shoe, Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,318 (1945).
1
7 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
"1 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,472 (1985).
"
9 1d. at 475.
'2 While the foundation of such a test was outlined in Burger King this particular test vs
created by the First Circuit in United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080
(1st Cir. 1992).
2 See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc. (Clue Computing ), 994 F. Supp. 34,44 (D. Mass.
1997).
'Lfd,
123 Justice O'Connor, in her plurality opinion, adopted a narrower interpretation of the majority's
"stream of commerce" theory, writing that "[t]he placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more" is not enough to satisfy the purposeful availment requirement for
minimum contacts. O'Connor focused on "deliberate availment" requiring additional conduct
on behalf of the defendant indicating an "intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum
state..." Advertising in the forum-state %as such an indication. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Super. Ct. of Cal, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
124 Clue Computing Z 994 F. Supp. at 44.
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requirement assures that "only those defendants that willingly and
purposefully avail themselves of the benefits of a state will be brought
to court there."'125 The defendant in Clue Computing I satisfied the
purposeful availment requirement in having reaped the benefits of
doing business within the forum-state by advertising on its web site.
The site was accessible to any Internet user in Massachusetts and
encouraged anyone and everyone in the state to contact Clue
Computing regarding a potential business relationship.
The final requirement of reasonableness is a balancing test
involving consideration of a series of objective factors. 12 6  The
reasonableness prong of the minimum contact trident exists primarily
to protect defendants from inconvenient litigation.'27 Such a
requirement also functions in hopes of not offending "traditional
notions of fair play and substantive justice."' 2  While the overall
analysis is rather straightforward, its application has been anything
but, with Clue Computing I exemplifying a rare example of clear-cut
application of specific jurisdiction and minimum contacts.
But cases like Burger King have also shown the legal community
that when an entity intentionally reaches beyond its boundaries to
conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of jurisdiction is
proper. 12 9 It follows that "[d]ifferent results should not be reached
simply because business is conducted over the Internet."' 130 However,
concepts of personal jurisdiction and its application have nonetheless
varied throughout the United States. The three-prong minimum
contacts analysis only delineates the outermost extremes of personal
jurisdiction. Nothing is to stop the individual states, in the application
of their LAJS, from eliciting a concophany of jurisdictional premises
with lesser jurisdictional requirements.
In the case of CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,13 ' the Sixth Circuit
addressed the application of personal jurisdiction over an entity
12 id.
126 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (explaining that the
balancing test for reasonableness in minimum contacts analysis asks the following questions:
What is the defendant's burden in appearing in the forum court; what is the forum-state's
interest in hearing the suit; what is the plaintiff's convenience and interest in effective relief;
what is the judicial system's interest in obtaining an effective resolution and what is the
common interest of all parties involved in light of current social policy?),
127 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
128 Int'l Shoe, Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
129 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
130 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa 1997).
131 CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
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whose only contact with the forum-state consisted of business
conducted over the Internet. Patterson, the defendant, had entered
into a shareware registration agreement with the plaintiff,
CompuServe, to distribute software through the plaintiffs Internet
server, located in the state of Ohio.132 Users of Patterson's shareware
programs paid a fee directly to the plaintiff and after CompuServe
retained a percentage for the use of its network server, Patterson
received the balance. 33 Patterson later claimed that CompuServe was
marketing programs that infiinged upon the trademark rights of his
products and CompuServe sought a declaratory judgment to the
contrary in the Southern District Court of Ohio.134  Patterson
responded with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 135
The district court reviewed the motion in light of Ohio's LAJS
that permitted extension of personal jurisdiction resulting from a non-
resident's transaction of business in the state.136 Using an analysis
similar to the three-pronged process set forth in Burger King,
Patterson was found to have "knowingly made an effort ... [and]
purposefully contracted ... to market a product in other states, with
Ohio-based CompuServe operating, in effect, as his distribution
center." 137 The CompuServe court additionally found Patterson had
"purposefully availed" himself of the legal benefits and protections
offered by the State of Ohio. 38  In light of such contractual and
financial behavior, Patterson "should [have] reasonably anticipate[d]
being haled into court."
139
CompuServe did note that merely entering into a contract is not a
per se establishment of minimum contacts with a state. 40 Patterson,
however, had sought to make sales of his shareware product from
Texas by way of CompuServe's network in Ohio with payment for





'3'See generally id. at 1260-61 (discussing the merits of Patterson's motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction).
136See Ofno REV. CODE AhTN. § 2307.382(A) (Anderson 1998).
137CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996).
181 d. at 1264.
339 Id. at 1263 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,474-75 (1985)).
'40 CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S.
102, 117 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("The placement of a product into the stream
of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the
forum State.").
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with the contractual arrangement, Patterson had created a relationship
that was ongoing in nature and was not a "one-shot affair" whereby
jurisdiction was found to be proper. 14 1
A minor limitation on personal jurisdiction over the Internet,
compared to that found in Clue Computing I, but in the same vein
nonetheless, was set forth by the District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri in Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.142 Cybergold designed
a web site promoting an e-mail/advertisement service at which
visitors were encouraged to register their e-mail addresses even
though the system was not in full service. 143  Maritz alleged
Cybergold's domain name infringed upon intellectual property rights
vested in a trademark application pending before the Patent and
Trademark Office. 144
Maritz asserted that personal jurisdiction over Cybergold was
proper as the web site was a promotional advertisement of the
Cybergold service and amounted to the transaction of business within
the State of Missouri. 145 The court agreed and dismissed Cybergold's
contention that the web site was a "passive Web site" as the
information provided on the site amounted to "active solicitation" and
"promotional activities.' 46  Furthermore, the court found the
defendant "indiscriminately responded to every user" who accessed
the site rather than avoid contact with users situated in the state of
Missouri.147  Cybergold "made their messages available to an
audience wider than those requesting the information... and anyone
else who may be watching."'148 As a result, Cybergold had
"consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all
14 1 See Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 385 (6th Cir. 1968). But see
Uncle Sam's Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Uncle Sam's Army Navy Outfitters-Manhattan, Inc., 96 F.
Supp. 2d 919, 921 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (noting that the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit that has
found its exercise of personal jurisdiction proper based only on the existence of a web site on a
server). See also Dostana Enters., LLC v. Fed. Express Corp., 2000 WL1170134, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2000) (holding the location of an Internet service provider that hosts a web
site is not relevant to choosing an appropriate forum in a trademark dispute based on a domain
name registration); Amberson Holdings, LLC v. Westside Story Newspaper, 110 F. Supp. 332,
335-37 (D.NJ. 2000) (holding that the location of a website server does not suffice to subject
the web site owner to personal jurisdiction).
142 Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
143 See generally id. at 1330 (discussing the business plan of Cybergold's web site venture).
'44 See id. at 1336.
141 See id. at 1330-31.; cf Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc. (Clue Computing 1), 994 F.
Supp. 34, 44 (D. Mass. 1997) (reaching a similar conclusion).
146Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
1471d.
148id
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Internet users, knowing such information [would] be transmitted
globally" much less to the State of Missouri.1
49
Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.15 0 reached a near
identical conclusion finding "advertisement via the Internet is
solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature"153 to satisfy the
Connecticut LAJS that required such behavior in order to establish
personal jurisdiction.152 The district court read minimum contacts as
requiring "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State."'153 Inset Systems identified the Internet as a tool "designed to
communicate with people and their businesses in every state" and
noted the advertisement, "once posted on the Internet, unlike
television and radio advertising,... is available continuously to any
Internet user."154
Under the Inset Systems holding, and the line of cases before it,
use of the Internet for any advertisement or contact will fulfill the
requirements of most state long arm statutes.155 Such a governing
principle of jurisdiction inevitably creates discomfort for Internet
merchants, not only in the United States, but throughout the world
knowing that they may be haled into court on the other side of the
globe simply for operating a web site at home.1"6
More confusing is the potential for application of clearly
contradicting standards of personal jurisdiction as they relate to an
Internet vendor and domain name infringement. Bensusan Restaurant
Corp. v. King157 is such a case where the plaintiff owned the rights to
149 See id. at 1333.
'sInset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
'Id. at 164.
' See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-41 1(c)(2) (1991).
"3Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 164-65 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958)).
'
4 Id. at 165. The logic expressed in Inset Sys. and other cases like it is reminiscent of the
effects test as set forth in Calder v. Jones. Calder held exercise ofpersonal jurisdiction under
the effects doctrine proper when there exists proof of an intentional action expressly aimed at,
and suffered in, the forum-state. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The effects test was, in
fact, expressly referenced in Panavision. Panavision Int'l, LP. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1322 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470,473 (9th Cir. 1995)
(explaining how the 'effects' doctrine satisfies the purposeful availment requirement necessary
for specific, personal jurisdiction).
55 Recall that Cybergold found jurisdiction not only because of the existence ofthe %veb site, but
because its operators responded to inquiries that would lead to a commercial relationship in
Missouri. Clue Computing Iconcurred, finding that the use of a web site advertising its %ares to
the residents of Massachusetts constituted existence of minimum contacts.
'm See Macoluso, supra note I11.
' Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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the federally registered mark The Blue Note, an affluent jazz club
located in New York's Greenwich Village.158 The defendant was the
owner of a small club in Missouri, also called 'The Blue Note,' and
the host of a web site promoting the club. 59 The site offered general
access to any Internet user and contained an address and telephone
number in Missouri for ordering tickets. 60 When the plaintiff sued
for trademark infringement in New York District Court, King asserted
that the New York LAJS failed to establish personal jurisdiction.' 61
The New York court agreed that the "mere fact that a person can gain
information on the allegedly infringing product is not the equivalent
of a person advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise making an
effort to target its production in [a forum-state].' 62
Finding King had not purposely availed himself of any benefits of
the State of New York, the district court declared that Internet users-
New York or otherwise-must take "several affirmative steps" to
obtain access to the defendant's web site.' 63 These steps included
finding the site on a search engine, calling the club by telephone and
physically picking up the tickets in Missouri as the defendant did not
offer mail delivery. 164
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.'65 reached a conclusion similar
to that of Bensusan Restaurant.166 The Ninth Circuit held that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a Florida corporation by the
State of Arizona was a violation of due process because "[Cybersell
Florida] ha[d] no contact[] with Arizona other than maintaining a
[Web] page... accessible to [anyone] ... over the Interet."'167 The
court based its decision on the need for "something more" to "indicate
that the defendant purposefully (albeit electronically) directed his
activity in a substantial way to the forum state."'16 Finding that
Cybersell had not engaged in "something more," the court concluded
"" Id. at 297.
"
9 1d. at 297-98.
60 See generally Bensusan Rest., 937 F. Supp. at 297-98 (discussing the various aspects of the
Missouri based web site).
'
61 1d. at 298.
16z Id. But see Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing (Clue Computing 1), 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass,
1997); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
t63 Bensusan Rest., 937 F. Supp. at 299.
I id.
65 Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
6 Contra Clue Computing 1, 994 F. Supp. 34, and Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. 161.
167 Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 415.
'"Id. at 418.
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exercise of personal jurisdiction was improper 69
This conflict of laws has become apparent in Panavision
International, L.P. v. Toeppen where Toeppen intentionally registered
Panavision's trademarks as domain names in an effort to force
Panavision to pay an extorted ransom; the effects of that extortive
conduct were felt by Panavision, a California corporation. 170 While
Panavision International permitted the extension of personal
jurisdiction under the aforementioned effects doctrine, the court
otherwise concurred with Bensusan Restaurant and Cybersell on the
issue of jurisdiction as "simply registering someone else's trademark
as a domain name and posting a Web site on the Internet is not
sufficient to subject a party domiciled in one state to jurisdiction in
another."17' The result is complete and utter confusion on the
personal jurisdiction issue. 72 A solution, however, was right around
the comer.
VIII. A FEDERAL FIX: THE ACPA
The most significant effect of the ACPA is that it creates a
legitimate, federal cause of action for bad faith attempts to profit from
the illicit use, confusion or tamishment of a confusingly similar
domain name.'73 A clearly positive aspect of the ACPA is that it
69 Id. at 420.
0 Panavision Int'l, LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998).
1711d. at 1322 (quoting Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418). The application of the 'effects doctrine' in
Panavision Int'L r. Toeppen should be distinguished from the case of KC.P.L., Inc. %, Mash, 49
U.S.P.Q.2d 1584 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). In the KC.P.L case, the plaintiff sought to register the
domain name <reaction.com> only to discover the defendant's registration. The plaintiff
contacted Nash and offered to purchase the site at which point Nash requested S8,000; plaintiff
rejected the offer. The plaintiff commenced a suit claiming that Nash was a cybersquatter. The
Court refused to extend personal jurisdiction over Nash and distinguished it from Panatislon
Int'l. because Nash legitimately sought to use the domain name for an online information
service Whereas Toeppen had no legitimate use and only held the domain names hostage.
Furthermore, Nash had only registered the domain name of <reaetion.com> and three other
names whereas Toeppen had registered hundreds of domain names; almost all of those names
were identical to another entity's trademark.
172 Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Rcport on Global Jurisdiction Issues
Created by the Internet, 55 THE BUs. LAWYER 1801, 1810 (2000) (noting that the American Bar
Association's Section of Business Law is well aware of the "novelty, complexities, and costs of
conflicting jurisdictional questions affecting online commerce" and henceforth drafted a 150-
page report on the jurisdiction problems with the Internet).
173 Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 2000, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (d) (West
2000).
(d) Cyberpiracy Prevention
(1) (A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard to
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attempts to differentiate between legitimate, albeit similar uses of
domain names on the Internet-like in the case of Clue Computing
II-while targeting those who clearly seek to profit from a trademark
holder's delay in registration.' 74 While the Section 43(a) cause of
the goods or services of the parties, that person -
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal
name which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that-
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar
to that mark;
(11) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar
to or dilutive of that mark; or
(1) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section
706 of title 18, United States Code or section 220506 of title 36,
United States Code.
174 See id.
(3)(i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described
under subparagraph (A), a court may consider such as, but not limited to:
(1) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person,
if any, in the domain name;
(E1) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal
name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to
identify that person;
(M) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark
in a site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's
online location to a site accessible under the domain name that
could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for
commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the
mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial
gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain
name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the
person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false
contact information when applying for the registration of the
domain name, the person's intentional failure to maintain accurate
contact information, or the person's prior conduct indicating a
pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain
names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar
to marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of
such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are
famous at the time of registration of such domain names, without
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action still remains for situations like Clue Computing 11 where both
parties do have legitimate claims and a potentially harmful likelihood
of confusion could arise, the newly added section (d) has hopefully
done away with faulty claims formerly permitted under Sections 43(a)
and (c) for lack of a better remedy.
The ACPA also creates a solution to the personal jurisdiction
problem. As was discussed earlier, a trademark holder might seek to
institute an action against an allegedly infringing registration in a
convenient forum-usually the home state of the business or
enterprise bringing the claim. However, because of the myriad
theories as to what constitutes personal jurisdiction over the Internet,
a party with a valid claim might have to suffer the time, expense and
embarrassment of having their claim dismissed for want of personal
jurisdiction. The ACPA provides for the filing of an in rem action
against the domain name itself, rather than the alleged infringer, in the
judicial district of the domain name registrar. 7 While not resolving
the personal jurisdiction in and of itself, the ACPA guarantees an
aggrieved plaintiff that it will ultimately be able to proceed ith its
cause of action via the in rein exception when personal jurisdiction
cannot be obtained.
Finally, the ACPA sets forth a clear set of remedies for acts
regard to the goods or services of the parties; and
(LX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's
domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous
within the meaning of subsection (c)(l) of this section...
175 See i&
(2)(A) The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain
name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name
registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain
name is located if-
(i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered
in the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) or
(c) of this section; and
(ii) the court finds that the owner-
(f) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who
would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1);
or
(I) through due diligence wvas not able to find a person who
would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1)
by-
(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to
proceed under this paragraph to the registrant of the
domain name at the postal and e-mail address provided by
the registrant to the registrar, and
(bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct
promptly after filing the action.
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deemed to be cybersquatting. For violations of the ACPA, "the
plaintiff may elect ... to recover, instead of actual damages and
profits, an award of statutory damages. 1 76  Such a provision, in
effect, allows an aggrieved trademark holder to seek damages "not
less than $1,000 and not more than $100,000 per domain name" just
by virtue of the cybersquatter having registered the mark.177 In effect,
a trademark holder may have never been damaged in any form or
fashion, yet still entitled to a sizeable statutory award. 78 The plaintiff
can still elect to receive actual damages, the defendant's profits, court
costs and, in exceptional cases, attorney's fees as were traditionally
available in Lanham Act claims prior to the ACPA amendments.1
79
IX. SEE SPORTY RUN: SPORTY'S FARM AND THE FIRST ACPA
DEcISIONs
A. Sporty's Farm LLC v. Sportsman's Market, Inc.
ISO
Sporty's Farm LLC v. Sportsman's Market, Inc. began as most
domain name disputes: filed under Section 43(c) of the FTDA.18l
176 15 U.S.C.A § 1117 (d) (West 2000).
177 Id. However, the actual amount is left to the court "as [it] considers just." Id,
178 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 8 (1999) (noting that the purpose of including this new, statutory
damages provision was "to deter wrongful conduct and to provide adequate remedies for
trademark owners who seek to enforce their rights in court"). Such a provision should act as a
deterrent to potential cybersquatters, but the opposite has occurred in at least one situation. See
Electronics Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. CIV.A. 00-4055, 2000 WL 1622760, at
*8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2000) (regarding continued cybersquatting behavior of the defendant
notwithstanding numerous monetary judgments against him).
179 Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 1125 (d) (West 2000). When a
violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a
violation under section 1125(a), (c), or (d) of title 15, the plaintiff is entitled to recover (1)
defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff and (3) the costs of the action. In
exceptional cases, the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. See Id.
It should be noted that in Broadbridge Media, LLC v. HyperCD.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), the court specifically found that the filing ofa UDRP complaint followed by a
federal court action under the ACPA is completely permissible. Broadbridge Media, 106 F.
Supp. 2d at 508-09. Paragraph 4(k) of T)E POLICY states that "[t]he mandatory administrative
proceeding requirements ... shall not prevent you from submitting the dispute to a court of
competent jurisdiction" before the proceeding is commenced or after the proceeding is
concluded. Rule 18 of the UDRP also states that the arbitration panel "shall have the discretion
to suspend or terminate the administrative proceedings, or to proceed to a decision" in the event
that legal proceedings are "initiated prior to or during an administrative proceeding." Therefore,
it is completely logical to permit an action for actual damages under the ACPA following an
expedited action for transfer under the UDRP. See infra note 234, § 18.
180 Sporty's Farm LLC v. Sportsman's Mkt, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000).
... Id. at 492.
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While an appeal was pending on the dilution claim,' 2 the ACPA
became law. The Second Circuit recognized, "[a]s a general rule, [it]
must apply the law that exists at the time of the appeal."'L8 3 Therefore,
finding that the ACPA "was adopted specifically to provide courts
with a preferable alternative to stretching federal dilution law when
dealing with cybersquatting cases," the Second Circuit elected to
forego a remand to the district court and applied the new law
accordingly.
184
The defendant and cross-appellant, Sportsman's Market, a mail
order catalog company, had a consumer base comprised mostly of
pilots and aviators. 85  Since the 1960s, Sportsman's used the
'SPORTY'S' logo to identify its catalogs and products and, in 1985,
registered the same with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO). 186 The plaintiff and appellant, Sporty's Farm, was a
subsidiary of another mail order catalog company, Omega, that
operated Pilot's Depot, LLC, and competed with Sportsman's Market
in the aviation catalog business.187 Omega, in early 1995, registered
the domain name <sportys.com> despite the fact that the owner of
Omega (and Pilot's Depot) was a pilot who received the Sportsman's
catalog and was fully aware of the 'SPORTY'S' trademark.""
In January 1996, nine months after the registration of
<sportys.com>, Omega formed Sporty's Farm and sold it the
aforementioned domain name for $16,200.' Sporty's Farm's sole
business enterprise was the farming and sale of Christmas trees and
advertised its business on the Internet via the <sportys.com> domain
name. 90 Ralph S. Michael, the CEO of Omega and manager of
Sporty's Farm, claimed to have chosen the name as a result of "a
18 The district court for the state of Connecticut issued an injunction ordering Sporty's Farm to
relinquish all rights to the domain name <sportys.com>. Sporty's Farm appealed thejudgment
as to the issuance of the injunction. Sportsman's sought an afTirmation of the district court
injunction as well as a reversal of the district court's denial of damages under the FTDA on a
cross-appeal. See id. at 495.
" Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 496 (quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
103, 110 (1801) ("If subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court,
a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs. The law must be obeyed, or its
obligation is denied.")).
' "Id. at 497.
'-Id. at 493.
' Id. at 494.
187Id.
'9 See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 494.
190 Id.
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childhood memory he had of his uncle's farm in upstate New York"
and "a dog named Spotty."'1' Michael thereafter referred to his
uncle's farm, and the land where the Christmas tree farm now
operated, as Spotty's farm--"the name Sporty's farm was , , . a
subsequent derivation.'
' 92
With these facts in hand, the Second Circuit first sought to
determine whether the 'SPORTY'S' mark was "a distinctive or
famous mark and thus entitled to the ACPA's protection."' 93 Finding
that 'SPORTY'S' was a distinctive mark, the court declined to
address the additional issue of whether 'SPORTY'S' also constituted
a famous mark.' 94 Next was a finding of whether the <sportys.com>
mark was "identical or confusingly similar to the sporty's mark."'195
While 'SPORTY'S' was not identical, per se, to <sportys.com>, it
was "certainly 'confusingly similar' to the protected mark under
[Section] 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I)."' 96 The third, and final, element of an
ACPA claim was a finding of "bad faith intent to profit" from the
registration of the <sporty.com> domain name. 97 The court found a
record replete with evidence of bad faith intent to profit from the
191 Id.
92id.
193 Id. at 497; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I), (11) (Supp. 2000):
A person shall be liable ... if ... that person registers, traffics in, or uses a
domain name that (1) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the
domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark.
'94 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497; see also id. at 497, n.10 (finding distinctiveness on the basis
of: extended period of use, advertising expenditures in excess of one million dollars, nationwide
use, trade in a variety of retail channels and registration on the principal register); see also /d. at
492, n.2 (addressing that certain symbols-like an apostrophe (')-cannot be used in a domain
name thus making <sportys.com> the domain name equivalent of the registered trademark
Sporty's); see also id, at 497-98 ("[T]he secondary domain name in this case (sportys) Is
indistinguishable from the Sportsman's trademark (sporty's)"). Cfi Brookfilid
Communications, Inc. v. Vest Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999)
(observing that the differences between the trademark Movie Buff and the domain name
<moviebuff.com> were "inconsequential in light of the fact that Web addresses arc not capg-
sensitive and that the '.com' top-level domain signifies the site's commercial nature."). See also
Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497 (noting that "[d]istinctiveness refers to inherent qualities of a
mark and is a completely different concept from fame" and may be such "when its fame is
nonexistent." The Sporty's Farm court had "no doubt that sporty's, as used in connection with
Sportsman's catalogue of merchandise and advertising, is inherently distinctive").
195 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(1) (West 2000); see also supra note 194 (discussing the
inconsequential differences between certain punctuation marks and capitalization).
196 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 498; cf. Wella Corp. v. Wella Graphics, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 54, 56
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that the mark WELLO GRAPHICS was confusingly similar to the
mark WELLA).
'97 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (,Vest 2000).
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registered mark of Sportsman's.I98 The most damning evidence,
however, was simple disbelief of the testimony offered as to the
reasoning behind the naming of the enterprise and its acquisition of
the <sportys.com> domain name. 99
Finding Omega was fully aware that 'SPORTY'S' was a strong
mark and that Omega/Pilot's Depot sought to enter a similar market
as Sportsman's, "[i]t cannot be doubted ... that Omega registered
sportys.com for the primary purpose of keeping Sportsman's from
using that domain name."200 Furthermore, the timing of the transfer
of <sportys.com> from Omega to Sporty's Farm in a continued effort
to keep Sportsman's from using the domain name and to protect itself
from an inevitable likelihood of confusion infringement claim
continued to raise questions as to the legitimacy and intentions of
Omega and Sporty's Farm.2°'
B. The Zuccarini Donmain Name Litigation
Within six months of the Sporty's Farm decision, two notable
ACPA cases were decided by the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania: Electronics Boutique Holdings Corp. v.
Zuccarini20 2 and Shields v. Zuccarini.213  Unlike Sport,'s Farm,
which dealt with the common act of misappropriating one party's
trademark as another's domain name, Shields and Electronics
Boutique involved the issue of intentional domain name
misspellings.2° In Shields, the defendant registered <joecarton.com>
and <joescartoon.com> 2 5; in Electronics Boutique, domain names
such as <electronicboutique.com>, <eletronicsboutique.com>,
<ebwold.com> and <ebworl.com> were registered by the
'
98 "Sporty's Farm was not formed until nine months after the domain name was registered, and
it did not begin operations or obtain the domain name from Omega until after this lawsuit was
filed." In addition, "the domain name [did] not consist of the legal name of the party that
registered it, Omega" and "although the domain name [did] include part of the name of Sporty's
Farm, that entity did not exist at the time the domain name was registered." Sporty's Farm, 202
F.3d at 498-99.
199 See generally id. at 499 (discussing the fact that the owners of Omega were "fully aware"
that sporty's was a distinctive mark).
0id.
201 See generally id. (noting that the coup de grace, however, was CEO Michael's story about
Spotty the dog as the court found the story "more amusing than credible"). Id.
702 Electronics Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (E.D. Pa. 2000).203 Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
204 In the Shields case, the legitimate domain name was that of<joecartooncom>; Eletronics
Boutique involved the names <electronicsboutique.com> and <ebwrold.com>.
20 Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
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defendant.
20 6
The business plan of the defendant was to divert Internet users
who sought access to legitimate web sites, but erroneously left out a
letter of the URL.2°7 The result was the Internet user being taken to
the legitimate site, but only after the user was "mousetrapped in a
barrage of advertising windows, featuring a variety of products.,
20 3
Zuccarini received between ten and twenty-five cents from the
advertisers for every pop-up window that the Internet user clicked on
in a fruitless effort to escape the advertising barrage.20 9
In both cases, the courts went on to address the situation under the
three-step analysis set forth in Sporty's Farm-(1) is the mark
distinctive or famous; (2) were the questioned domain name and the
legitimate trademark/service mark identical or confusingly similar
and (3) was there bad faith intent to profit?210 Finding, in both cases,
that the legitimate marks were distinctive,2 11 the court went on to
address what, in these two cases, turned out to be the most important
elements-confusion and similarity.
206 Electronics Boutique, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1706; note that the "s", "C", "r" and "d" are missing,
respectively.
207 Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 640 n.7 ("Specifically, Zuccarini testified before [the court] that lie
was amazed to learn 'people mistype [sought domain names] as often as they do,' and thus
variants on actual spellings would result in many unintended visitor to Zuccadni's sites."),
208 Electronics Boutique, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1708.
209 See id.; see also Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 635. The Internet user could not simply close out
the unwelcome pop-up window by "clicking on the 'X' in the top right-hand comer of the
screen, a common way to close a web browser window, [it would] not allow a user to exit."210 See Sporty's Farm LLC v. Sportsman's Mkt, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000).
211 Both the Electronics Boutique and Shields courts applied the factors set forth by 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c) as the test for determining distinctiveness or famousness. This was the same test
applied, above, by Sporty's Farm, although not discussed in detail. Section 1125(c), considers
eight factors:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods and
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and the channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom [relief] is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c)(1) (West 2000). Additional factors may also be considered. For
example, the very registration of a trademark on the principal register entitles the registrant to a
"presumption that its registered trademark is inherently distinctive." Morrison & Foerster LLP
v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130 (D. Colo. 2000) (citations and quotation omitted),
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Judge Dalzell, in Shields, found the allegedly infringing domain
names "for all practical purposes identical to 'joecartoon.com', and
because ... Zuccarini registered them for that very reason" "easily
conclude[d] that they are 'confusingly similar."',2 2 Judge Schiller, in
Electronics Boutique, agreed while noting "the profitability of Mr.
Zuccarini's enterprise is completely dependent on his ability to create
and register domain names that are confusingly similar to famous
names."213  Both courts also referenced the presentation of
documentary evidence indicating the confusion of Internet users
seeking to access the legitimate web sites of the plaintiffs.
214
The issue of bad faith intent was addressed in a similarly
expedient manner as both courts found that the "bad-faith intent to
profit from the domain misspelling [was] abundantly clear" in light of
the belief "that Internet users will misspell the domain names of the
websites they intend to access and instead access one of Mr.
Zuccarini's websites."215 The end result in both cases was a slight -
but entirely legitimate-expansion or redefinition of the
cybersquatting activity prohibited by the ACPA.
C. Bihari v. Gross
Bihari v. Gross2 l represents the third, and final, class of distinct
litigation thus far filed and resolved under the ACPA-that of
metatags. 2 7  Bihari involved a dispute between Gross, a web-savvy
2
'
2 Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 639.
213 Electronics Boutique, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1710.
214 In Electronics Boutique, an Internet user, via an e-mail, wrote "I do not know if you are
affiliated with www.electronicbotique.com, but I believe you are." Id. at 1710, n.13. Likewise,
in Shields, a confused user wrote, "I tried to look up you[r] website yesterday afternoon and a
protest page came up. Will I have trouble entering the site at times because of this?" Shields,
89 F. Supp. 2d at 639. In Shields, the defendant replaced his advertising windos 'uith a protest
page shortly after the lawsuit was filed and served, apparently in an attempt to claim lack of
commercial enterprise and a First Amendment free speech defense. Sce id. at 635-36.
21- Electronics Boutique, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1711; sce also Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 639-40
(referring to Zuccarini's deposition where he admitted that "he registered the variations on 'Joe
Cartoon,' as well as thousands of other domain names, because they are confusingly similar to
others' famous marks or personal names-and thus are likely misspellings of these names-in
an effort to divert Internet traffic to his sites.").
216 Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309,311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
217A metatag is hypertext markup language (HTML) code, invisible to the Internet user, that
permits web designers to describe their webpage. There are two different types of metatags:
keyword and description. The keyword metatags permits designers to identify search terms for
use by search engines. Description metatags allows designers to briefly describe the contents of
their pages. This description appears as sentence fragments beneath the wbpage's listing in a
search result. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 312, n.3. See Scott Clark, ifeta Tag Tutorial, Back to
Basics: META Tags, Part 2 (explaining that the practical HTML coding of metatags on a
349
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apartment owner in New York City, and Bihari, the owner of Bihari
Interiors, a New York City interior decorating company.218 A
disagreement arose between Bihari and Gross as to the quality of
work performed by Bihari for Gross's condominium apartment; Gross
responded by posting his displeasure on the Internet via the domain
names <designscam.com> and <manhattaninteriordesign.com>.2
t1
While the domain name may not have contained the common law
marks claimed by Bihari, "[a]ll of the Gross websites use[d] 'Bihari
Interiors' as metatags embedded within the websites' HTML code.' 220
Bihari proceeded to amend an earlier complaint alleging that the
use of the Bihari Interiors metatags violated the plaintiffs rights
under the ACPA.221 The court disagreed, finding that while "no court
has expressly stated that the ACPA does not apply to metatags, the
plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history make this
conclusion apparent.,
222
The court's refusal to extend the prohibitions of the ACPA to
metatag use is supported by previous trademark cases involving the
Internet. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles,223 the court found
former Playboy Playmate of the Month Terri Welles within her legal
rights to use the terms 'Playboy' and 'Playmate of the Month' as
metatags for the identification of her own personal web site. In
refusing Playboy's request for an injunction, the court reasoned that
the use of Playboy's registered trademarks constituted fair use. 4 In
particular, the court found that there is "no trademark infringement
where [the] defendant has used [the] plaintiff's trademarks in good
faith to index the contents of her website" and that "much like the
subject index of a card catalog, the metatags give the websurfer using
website, for example, uses the keywords attribute to tell a search engine which keywords are
associated with your web site: <META NAME="keywords" CONTENT="domain name
infringement, ACPA, UDRP, trademarks, FTDA">. Likewise, use of the description attributo
provides a description summary of the web site: <META NAME="description"
CONTENT="This comment is about domain name infringement; in particular the new ACPA
and the UDRP as especially designed alternatives to the FrDA in matters of trademark
infringement."), at http://wwv.webdeveloper.com/html/html-metatags.part2.html (last visited
Apr. 23, 2001).




m Id. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999) (Congress's purpose in adopting the ACPA was to
"protect consumer and American businesses ...by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive
registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names .... ).
22 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
2
4 Id. at 1104.
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a search engine a clearer identification of the content of a website."
'2
The Bihari reasoning was similar as "Gross had included 'Bihari
Interiors' in the metatags of his websites because the websites provide
information about Bihari Interiors ... [and] to fairly identify the
content of his websites. In short, Gross used the 'Bihari Interiors'
mark in its descriptive sense only.,2 6 The court slammed the door on
this attempted extension of the ACPA in finding that "[a]n Internet
user who reads this text, and then sees the domain name of
'designscam.com' or 'manhattaninteriordesign.com' is unlikely to
believe that these websites belong to Bihari Interiors or Bihari." 227
The application of likelihood of confusion, as in Welles-not the
ACPA, is clearly the proper cause of action for metatags.
X. ARBITRATION AND THE UDRP: BUILDING A BETTER
MOUSETRAP
A. The UDRP
The Department of Commerce in 1998 responded to what it
deemed 'The Trademark Dilemma' z22 by calling "upon the World
Intellectual Property Organization (VIPO) to initiate a balanced and
transparent process.., to... develop recommendations for a uniform
approach to resolving trademark/domain name disputes involving
cyberpiracy (as opposed to conflicts between trademark holders with
legitimate competing rights)."2 9 The result was the UDRP, a
"procedure... handled in large part online, [and] designed to take
less than 45 days, and.., cost about $1000 in fees."
230
= Id But see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc., No. CIV.A.97-734-A, 1998 VL
724000, at *3, **6-7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) (enjoining the use of the marks 'Playboy' and
'Playmate' in the domain name and metatags of defendant's website <asian-playnmates.com>
and <playmates-asian.com> which also contained the trademarks Playboy and Playmate in the
embedded HTML metatags; no relationship ever existed between Playboy Enterprises and the
defendant).
226 Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 309,322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
27 Id. at 320.
= The Department of Commerce, specifically the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, found that "[w]hen a trademark is used as a domain name without
the trademark owner's consent, consumers may be misled about the source of the product or
service offered on the Intemet, and trademark owners may not be able to protect their rights
without very expensive litigation" and for "cyberspace to finction as an effective commercial
market, businesses must have confidence that their trademarks can be protected." MgmL of
Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,746 (June 10, 1998).
29Id. at 31,747.
230 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAEs AND NmBERS (ICANN), Frequently Asked
Questions on Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, available at
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The UDRP was an effort to resolve "disputes involving domain
names that are shown to have been registered in abusive attempts to
profit from another's trademark (i.e. cybersquatting and
cyberpiracy). 23 t In "cases of abusive registration," the UDRP allows
for "a special administrative procedure to resolve the dispute" "by
neutral persons selected from panels established for that purpose.
,232
The UDRP has since "been adopted by all accredited domain-name
registrars for domain names ending in .com, .net, and .org" via
incorporation into domain name registration agreements.
233
The process for instituting a claim under the UDRP is relatively
simple as the complaining party submits a procedurally complete
complaint to one of the alternative dispute resolution agencies
certified by ICANN to participate in the UDRP.234  Following
selection of a one or three-member panel and the membership of that
panel, 35 the complainant pleads three elements of its claim: (1) how
the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the
complainant's trademark or service mark rights; (2) why the
responding party (the holder of the disputed domain name) has no
legitimate interest in the domain name and (3) why the disputed
domain name has been registered and used in bad faith.236
Bad faith is a prerequisite for a finding in favor of the
complainant and may be exhibited by four non-exclusive incidents
related to the registration and use of the domain name: (1) acquisition
of a domain name "primarily for the purpose of selling . . . or
otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the
complainant [for consideration exceeding] out of pocket costs"; 237 (2)
http://www.icann.org/general/faql.htm (Sept. 13, 1999) (hereinafter FAQ).
231 id.
232 Id.
233 THE POLIcY at n.2 ("It has also been adopted by certain managers of country-code top-level
domains (e.g., .nu, .tv, .ws).").
234 See THE RULES, supra note 34, § 3(a) ("Any person or entity may initiate an administrative
proceeding by submitting a complaint in accordance with the Policy and these Rules to any
Provider approved by ICANN."); see also ]NTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND
NUMBERS (ICANN), Approved Providers for Uniforn Domain Dispute Resolttion Policy
(providing a roster of approved arbitration services, namely wIPO, the National Arbitration
Forum and eResolutions), available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm (last
updated Oct. 17, 2000).
235 See THE RULES § 3(b)(iv) ("Designate whether Complainant elects to have the dispute
decided by a single-member or a three-member Panel and, in the event Complainant elects a
three-member Panel, provide the names and contact details of three candidates to serve as one of
the Panelists.").
236 See THE POLICY § 4(a)(i-iii).
23'Id. § 4(b)(i).
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registration of the domain name to "prevent the owner of the
trademark... from reflecting the [trade]mark in a corresponding
domain name"28 ; (3) acquisition of a domain name for "disrupting
the business of a competitor"2 9 and (4) acquisition and use of a
domain name to divert Internet users to another web site "for
commercial gain" "by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
complainant's mark as to the source... of [the] web site."2 40
Within twenty-two days of receipt of a response or rebuttal from
the respondent, the arbitrator or panel resolves the dispute "on the
basis of the statements and documents submitted" by the parties.
241
No personal appearances, subpoenas or extended discovery are
required. The arbitrator or panel then submits its decision to the
parties, ICANN and the domain name registrar then cancels or
transfers the domain name absent the commencement of a declaratory
judgment action by the respondent against the complainant.2 42
B. A Blueprint for Success: World Wrestling Federation
Entertainment, Inc. v. Bosnian
In World Wrestling Federation,243 Michael Bosman registered the
domain name <worldwrestlingfederation.com> with the Australian-
based domain name registrar Melbourne IT for sixty dollars and then
offered to sell it to the World Wrestling Federation (WWF) only three
days later for $1,000.244 Bosman, along with his offer for sale,
attempted to pull the wool over the eyes of the WWF by claiming
cybersquatting litigation "typically accomplish[es] very little and
2
" Id. § 4(b)(ii).
2" Id § 4(b)(iii).
24'I d § 4(b)(iv).
241 THE RULES % 6, 15, 16. After receiving the response from the respondent (within 20 days
from commencement of proceeding, see 5), the Provider within 5 days of receipt, appoints a
panel if the respondent or complainant has not chosen one (see 6). The panel then has 14 days
to decide the case "on the basis of the statements and documents submitted" and forard its
decision to the Provider (see 15). The Provider then has 3 days to communicate the decision
to the parties (see 16).
242 THE POLICY § 3. Either a transfer or cancellation is the sole remedy, but it is possible to seek
damages under the ACPA. See Broadbridge Media, LLC v. HyperCD.com, 105 F. Supp. 2d
505,508-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
243 World Wrestling Fed'n Entrn't, Inc. v. Michael Bosman, WIPO, No. D99-0001 (Jan. 14,
2000), available at http'/arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisionthtmlfd99-000l.html.
.44 See generally id.; see also M. Scott Donahey & Ryan S. Hilbert, World Wrestling Fed n
Entr 't, Inc. v. Aichael Bosman: A Legal Body Slam for Cybersquallers on the Web, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTYER & IGH TECH. LU. 419, 422 (2000) (discussing the general factual
background to the UDRP procedure with commentary provided by the arbiter of that hearing,
M. Scott Donahey).
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end[s] up costing the companies thousands of dollars in legal fees,
wasted time and energy.' 245 The WWF did not take the bait and
instituted proceedings under the UDRP-which had become effective
only one day prior.
246
Under the UDRP, arbitrator M. Scott Donahey found "that the
domain name <worldwrestlingfederation.com> is identical or
confusingly similar to the trademark and service mark registered and
used by [the WWF]. '247 Likewise, Donahey found that Bosman had
"no rights or legitimate interests" in the domain name in question.248
The bad faith element, however, generated the most worthwhile
discussion where Bosman must have not only registered the domain
name in bad faith,249 but additionally used the domain name in bad
faith to be found liable under the UDRP.
The arbitrator, at this point, referred to the two cases that have
become the epitome of domain name litigation in the United States in
support of his finding of bad faith use- Panavision International and
Intermatic. Donahey cited Panavision International's holding that
Toeppen's intention to sell the domain name constituted bad faith
registration of the plaintiffs mark and Intermatic's conclusion that
Toeppen's actual offer to sell the domain name was commercial use
under the Lanham Act.250 Therefore, bad faith use under the UDRP,
the third required element, was established. The result: transfer of the
pirated domain name back to the WWF.25 t
C. Does the UDRP Discriminate?
Despite the apparent success of the UDRP as exhibited by World
Wrestling Federation and a plethora of other disputes decided under
24 5 Id.
246 See Donahey & Hilbert, supra note 244, at 422, n.7 ("The first day complaints could be
submitted to dispute-resolution providers for disputes involving domain names . . under
ICANN's new Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy was December 1, 1999.").247 Id. at 423 (quoting World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Michael Bosman, wIPO, No. D99-
0001 (Jan. 14,2000)).
248 id.
249 Since Bosman offered to sell the domain name to the WVF only three days after its initial
acquisition, the arbitrator found that the name was registered in bad faith. See id. at 423, n.15
(quoting World Wrestling Fed'n Entre't, Inc. v. Michael Bosman, WIPO, No. D99-0001 (Jan.
14,2000)).
250 "[A]lthough it was unnecessary to consider the laws of the United States in rendering a
decision, because both of the parties were domiciled in the United States, and United States
courts had had recent experience in dealing with similar disputes, the arbitrator looked to these
cases for assistance." See Donahey & Hilbert, supra note 244, at 423, n.17.
25
' Id. at 424.
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The Policy, a recent statistical analysis, prepared by Dr. Milton
Mueller of Syracuse University, suggests that the UDRP permits
"selection of dispute resolution service providers by challengers" and
results in "forum shopping that biases the results [of a UDRP
decision]." z 2 Dr. Mueller's study found that the WIPO arbitration
panels and the National Arbitration Foundation (NAF) panels were
"the most complainant-friendly providers" and eResolutions, of
Canada, was "the most defendant friendly.' 'a 3 Furthermore, "[b]oth
NAF and WIPO tend to interpret the UDRP in ways that favor
trademark holders over other Internet users, whereas eResolutions
decisions tend to adhere more closely to the strict language of the
policy.
254
Dr. Mueller's study is founded on the first 1,170 cases submitted
and resolved under the UDRP. 764 of those cases resulted in a
transfer of the disputed domain name; statistically, 78.4% of UDRP
filings resolved in favor of the complainant. 2"5 But in the case of
WIPO, which heard 493 disputes during the period of the study, 333
(67.5%) were resolved in favor of the complainant; NAF, who heard
355 cases, found for the complainant 254 times (71.5%) whereas
eResolutions favored the complainant only 38 of its 86 total cases
(44.2%).2
6
This schism in decisions between panels parallels an interesting
trend regarding market share over the ten-month period of
observation (January through October 2000). During that time frame,
WIPO's market share of all domain name disputes submitted under
the UDRP grew from an already impressive 48% in January/February
to its peak of 66% in the final month of the study.2 7 eResolutions,
however, experienced a marked decrease in market share, from 10%
in the January/February time frame to a scant 4% in October despite
hovering around 7-9% from April to September.2" NAF experienced
a similar decrease that was likely due to the increase in WIPO's
252 Dr. Milton Mueller, Rough Justice An Analysis of lCANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution




'5 Id. Additionally, 191 (19.6%) complaints were dismissed-decisions for the respondent, 16
(1.6%) resulted in cancellation of the domain name and 4 (0A%) resulted in split decisions (i.e.
multiple domain names were brought under a complaint with the decision favoring both parties
as to some of the disputed domain names).
256 id.
257 See id.
258 Mueller, supra note 252
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share.2 9 Such a decrease would tend to indicate that complainants
slowly, but surely, learned where to file their disputes-with the
complainant friendly WIPO panels.
Pricing, like market share, tends to indicate bias. eResolutions,
the resolution service provider with the lowest market share, also,
strangely enough, had the lowest fee at $750 for a case involving one
or two domain names.260 But WPO-the dispute resolution provider
with the largest market share-charged $1,000 for a complaint
involving one to five domain names.26' The cheapest service provider
of an identical service had the smallest market share. Common
economic sense tells us that an identical product should be sought out
at its lowest available price. The UDRP appears to be the exception.
The only correlative factor, according to Dr. Mueller, could be
that eResolutions tends to favor the respondent when complainants
tend to be "the economic drivers of [the] marketplace and are
potentially in a position to 'forum shop' for the resolution provider
... they think will be the most sympathetic to their claims." '262 This
conclusion is not implausible as the majority of complainants under
the UDRP are larger corporate enterprises with the money to select
the resolution service most favorable to their concems-WIPO-who
also happens to be the most expensive provider.263 However, even
Dr. Mueller recognizes that the development of a more complete
record would allow for a more comprehensive and accurate finding.26
XI. Is Tins TowN BIG ENOUGH FOR THE BOTH OF Us? THE CO-
EXISTENCE OF THE ACPA AND UDRP
As of November 1, 2000, only twenty-seven published cases
could be found that were brought under the ACPA.26 5 However, in
2'9 NAF's share of the market started at 43% in January/February and steadily declined to 38%
in March, 33% in April, 29% in May and June to 27%, 26% and 28% in July-August.
respectively, before finally ending at 27% in the final month of the study. Id.




263 Id. Of the 621 cases decided, these percentages represent the decisions in favor of the
complainant versus the respondent, but in only those cases that resulted in a decision (i.e. no
settled cases or terminated cases were considered in this comparison): eResolutions 51% to 49%
in 49 eases; NAF 81% to 19% in 252 total cases; WIPO 82% to 18% in 320 cases. Id.
264 Mueller, supra note 252. ("[lf [resolution service providers] develop a more extensive
record, we can obtain more robust results on this item.").
265 The author of this comment searched for such cases utilizing Westlaw, Lexis and a number of
weekly publications addressing intellectual property cases. The author recognizes that there
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approximately the same time period, 5,692 (as of March 8, 2001)
disputes were processed under ICANN's UDRP.2 66 While much was
made of the passage of the ACPA by congressional and industry
leaders, the reality of public preference is clear.
"The [UDRP] is intended for a restricted kind of case to give
trademark owners a streamlined way of resolving cases." 2617 This
might perhaps explain the extremely high percentage of findings for
complainants as most UDRP submissions involve clear-cut cases of
cybersquatting. "The other important feature [of the UDRP] is that
the policy applies throughout the Internet" as "U.S. courts are not
always convenient if a domain name holder is in France." 2
69
Jeff Glitchel, who represented the WWF in the first application of
the UDRP, found The Policy to be both a time and money saver in
that it was "very quick, relatively inexpensive, and.., cut down on
investigative costs" which are often associated with protracted
litigation-like suits brought under the ACPA.269  Even Michael
Bosman, the cybersquatter in WWTF, found the WIPO dispute
resolution process to be run by a "good organization" in addition to
being "fair and unbiased.,
271
However, others like Dr. Mueller clearly find the UDRP lacking
in some respects-namely forum shopping.271 As a simple solution,
however, Dr. Mueller suggests that "[c]ases could be assigned to
[resolution service providers] randomly" but this runs the risk of
causing the case load of an arbiter to become "detached from its price
and performance." 272 This dilemma could be met, however, with an
effort by ICANN to regulate prices, set standards for performance and
require continual reaccredidation to arbitration providers which
would, in turn, make even more uniform what is already, in theory, a
uniformly applied dispute resolution policy.
may be cases that he failed to discover, but not so many as to counter the point of mentioning
this statistic.
THE INTERNEr CoRPo AoTIN FoR ASSiGNED NAiMs AND NUNmIEs (ICANDN), STATSTCAL
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER UNIFORi DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION Pouc, at
http.//wvw.icann.orgludrpfproceedings-stat.htm (Jan. 30, 1999). The ACPA was signed into
law on November 29, 1999. The UDRP became effective on December 1, 1999.
267Debra Baker, WWF Goes to the Mat Over Web Site, 86 A.B.A.J. MAGAZINE 18, 19 (2000)
(quoting Louis Touton, Vice President and General Counsel for ICANN).
268d.
269 Id.
270 Jeri Clausing, Wrestling Group Wins Back Use ofIts Name on Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2000, at C4.
271 See Mueller, supra note 252.
2
n id.
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While the ACPA is a legal remedy burdened by the realities of
litigation, it does have its place in the world despite the ultra-fast
alternative of the UDRP. Keep in mind that under the UDRP, the
only remedy is that of transfer or cancellation of the domain name.
27 3
No matter how egregious the act of cybersquatting, the number of
domain names squatted on or the tenor of the respondent in the
proceedings, the complainant will never collect a dime of losses, cost
or attorney's fees.
Such recovery is possible under the ACPA.274 Thus, in such cases
of extreme cybersquatting or where another party actually reaps the
substantial benefits of confusing the consumer through an identical
domain name, the financial remedies offered by the ACPA-despite
the burdens of federal litigation-become much more attractive.
Recent discussion of the two remedies has made a case for a vicarious
relationship permitting the rapid transfer of the domain name under
the UDRP and then permitting damages under the ACPA to actually
punish and deter the offender from future conduct.
275
Notwithstanding the damages issue, the UDRP does lack in other
respects as well. The UDRP was implemented with the intention to
confine its application to "cases of deliberate, bad faith abusive
registrations."27 a Furthermore, the UDRP was designed to be limited
only to "trademarks and service marks" as the law governing "trade
names, geographical indications and personality rights is less evenly
harmonized throughout the world.
2 77
However, at the request of the Australian Minister for
Communication, Information Technology and the Arts, a Second
Report on Internet Names and Addresses was recently sponsored by
WIPO. 278 The Second Report will cover a number of the issues that
the First Report chose to temporarily exclude from the purview of the
273 See THE POLICY § 4(i).
274 See 15 U.S.C.A § 1117(d) (Vest 2000).
275 Cf. Broadbridge Media, LLC v. HyperCD.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 508-09 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
276 wIPO, FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS: TIl;
MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES, ] 166, available at
http://wipo2.wipo.int.processl/reportlindex.html (Apr. 30, 1999).
2
" Id. 167.
278 See Letter from The Honorable Richard Alston, Minister for Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts, Australian Senate, to Dr. Kamil Idris, Director General, World
Intellectual Property Association (June 28, 2000) (on file with the WIPO), available at
http:llwipo2.wipo.intlprocess2/rfelletter2.htnil. See also WIPO, Second WIPO Internet Domain
Name Process (regarding the second conference), at http:lwipo2.wipo.intlprocess2 (last visited
Mar. 3,2001).
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UDRP, including: personal names, intergovernmental organizations,
geographical indications, trade names and pharmaceutical
substances.279 The Second Report should be available in mid-2001 .
XII. THE FAILURE OF THE ACPA AND UDRP TO ADDRESS THE
ACTUAL PROBLEM
Despite the clear success of the UDRP and the increased
effectiveness of the ACPA in light of the earlier overextension of the
FTDA, there does exist fundamental issues that need to be addressed.
In the case of the ACPA, it is clearly a unilateral solution to an
international problem. Although President Clinton signed the anti-
cybersquatting legislation into law, albeit as part of a larger
appropriations bill, there were serious rumblings from the White
House as to its excessively local nature. "We believe that
fundamentally we'd be walking down the wrong road if we legislated
a cybersquatting law and the 200 or so Internet countries around the
world started legislating their own rules and laws," said then White
House Press Secretary, Joe Lockhart.281 While the White House
supported some form of anti-cybersquatting legislation, its
implementation was sought through an international treaty process. 28
This multinational stance advocated by the Clinton White House
made sense when paired with the understanding that "[tihe Internet is
an international system. 283 Why should legislation designed by the
United States be the ivory tower of cybersquatting standards? Not to
challenge the sovereign law making powers of the United States, but
due to the international nature of the Internet and its related problems,
there should undoubtedly be international input for a resolution of the
problem.2 4
The cause of domain name infringement is ultimately rooted in
trademark and unfair competition law. As the international
community has international trademark treaties, why not international
domain name treaties? For example, the Madrid Agreement
Concerning the International Registration of Marks as well as the
Madrid Protocols permit a person to obtain international trademark
279 See Alston Letter, supra note 278.
2" See WIPO, SECOND WIPO IN'ERNE DOMAIN NAmE PROCESS (regarding the second
conference), at http'J/vipo2.wipo.int/process2 (last visited Apr. 23, 2001).
281 Statement by Joe Lockhart, White House Press SecreaLy (Oct. 28, 1999) (on file with
author).2S2 i
' Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831, 4 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
Note the aforementioned success of the internationally supported UDRP.
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registration having effect in some or all of the other member countries
of the Madrid Union.285 Could the United States and other Internet
nations not reach some consensus regarding the registration of
domain names or even create an amendment to the already existing
trademark treaties?
Furthermore, the legal community must acknowledge that not all
the domain name legislation in the world can physically prevent an
individual from registering an infringing domain name. The
gatekeepers ultimately must be those that are responsible for domain
names, legitimate or otherwise, reaching the Intemet-domain name
registrars. But with a multitude of registrars for the <.com> TLD
alone, not to mention the regional registrars for the seemingly
countless ccTLDs and the soon to be released new TLDs, 286 is it
possible to create harmony among the masses?
Is adopting a world supervising body for the Internet the solution?
By passing the domain name infringement problem onto this
hypothetical supervisory agency, the Internet nations of the world find
the issue in the hands of specialists who will address and resolve the
issue in a consistent, uniform and, hopefully, fair manner. By placing
the responsibility of domain name registration in a singular, neutral,
non-aligned organization, there is a lesser chance of conflict with
local laws and such an organization could eventually seek to reconcile
domain name policies with international trademark treaties.
But is an international organization too excessive? Is, perhaps,
the current plan adopted by ICANN, the assignment of new TLDs, the
answer? In this author's opinion, this last option is clearly not the
answer, but rather furthering the cause of the problem. Consider this:
why should a small, local business with a common law trademark
right in 'Trademark, Co.' be superceded by the later obtained, federal
trademark rights of the industrial giant, 'Trademark, Inc.' when it
comes to registering a trade name on the Internet? Trademark law
and regional exclusions solve this problem in the world of brick and
mortar, but on the Internet, such exclusions are not possible. Our
hypothetical is eerily similar to the dispute in Clue Computing II.
285 WIPO, WHAT IS A TRADEMARK?, WIPO Publication No. L450TM.E. (on file with author).
.M6 The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), New TLD Program,
at http://wwv.icann.orgttlds (last updated Feb. 3, 2001). Per a November 16, 2000, meeting of
ICANN, the Board elected to adopt seven new TLDs and is currently in the process of
negotiating agreements with registrars for their use in commerce. Those TLDs will be: <.acro>
for the air-transport industry, <.biz> for businesses, <.coop> for non-profit cooperatives, <,info>-
for unrestricted use, <.museum> for museums, <.name> for individual registrations and <.pro>-
for professionals such as accountants, lawyers and physicians.
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How does Internet jurisprudence reconcile the domain name rights of
one party with those of another in a way that is legal, equitable and
functional?
One solution is for the Internet community to "scrap the present
system of lettered TLDs and replace them with the 42 numeric
International Classes used by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in
sorting trademark registrations. These 42 classes have fairly elastic
borders. Taken together, they cover all of the goods and services in
commerce." 287  There could exist one TLD for automakers
<trademark.012>, another TLD for clothing companies
<trademark.025> and another for telecommunications providers
<trademark.038>. Such a format would "eliminate the congestion
caused by the commercial cachet of the .com TLD" and through the
increase of potential TLDs such a format would also "reduce the 'first
come, first served' rush" of the current system.288 However, the
current problem could still occur if two companies with identical
names happen to be in the same field of commerce. Now, instead of a
dispute over <.com>, the parties would argue over <.00 1>.
Perhaps the only absolute solution is to scrap the concept of
domain names all together and operate on pure IP addresses alone.
While the concept seems extreme, we in fact use a similar system
every day-telephone numbers. When someone wants to call their
best friend John Doe, the caller does not type 'J-O-H-N-D-O-E' on
the numeric keypad; the caller dials the number assigned to John Doe.
So why can't the Internet user who wants to visit the web site for
Yahoo! simply enter the IP address for that site? In reality, the IP
address is not much longer than a phone number.
Those opposed to such a plan would surely claim that IP
addresses are too complex and question how we are to remember all
the IP addresses of the sites we visit most? Refer again to the
comparison with the telephone. Do you remember every phone
number for every person you call? Likely, the answer is no. When a
telephone caller does not know a phone number, the caller reaches for
the phone book and finds the desired number. The same principle is
'8 Letter from LawenceJ. Siskind, Head of Cooper, White& Cooper Intellectual Property Law
Group to Ms. Patrice Washington, National Tele-Communications and Information
Administration Office of Public Affairs (Aug. 19, 1997), available at
htt'./Iwww.ntia.doe.gov/ntiahomedomainname/not-emailedfsiskind.htn. Sce also Laweace J.
Siskind, Grabbing ofCyberclaims, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, available at
http-//www.law.comfcgi-binlgx.cgi!AppLogic+FrContentServer?pagename-lawvNiv&c-
Article&cid=A9074-1999Nov5&live--true&ast= I&pcO=&pa=o.
288 See Siskind Letter, supra note 287.
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already in effect with Internet search engines. The user types in the
name of the service he seeks to find, the search engine delivers the
name of the site and a short description (not much unlike a name and
address in the phone book) and then provides a hyperlink to the IP
address (the phone number). And much like with speed dial on a
telephone for commonly called numbers, every web browser in
existence has some sort of bookmark or favorites system for easy
access to oft visited web sites. Such a system would alleviate the
likelihood of confusion, dilution and cybersquatting by eliminating
conflicting rights to domain names and replacing them with IP
addresses, for which there can be only one for each company and a
supply of which that is far from exhaustion.
Adoption of this proposed system would undoubtedly raise
resistance from individuals and businesses having already established
a recognizable and memorable domain name with one of the current
TLDs. Doomsday prophets might even compare such a task as more
heinous than an American switch to the metric system. The change
would not be as gargantuan a mission as many would proclaim. The
switchover process would be like that of changing telephone area
codes and prefixes.289 Such an event happens with increasing
regularity as metropolitan areas grow and populations increase and
disperse resulting in an increasing need for new telephone numbers.
Why should the SLD/TLD situation be viewed any differently as
the demand for domain names on the Internet continues to grow?
While there might be some inconvenience at first, after dialing the
wrong number one or two times, callers become accustomed to the
change and continue with their daily lives, often forgetting that the
change ever took place. The situation would likely be the same with
the Internet as the user inputs a wrong IP address once or twice and
then remembers the change for future reference. And as mentioned
earlier, there is always a plethora of search engines available to
remedy the problem of forgotten IP addresses.
XlII. CONCLUSION
A change to the current TLD system, along with heightened
scrutiny in the registration process and strict adherence to the
principles of the ACPA and UDRP are key to the future resolution of
domain name infringement. Notwithstanding these proposals, the
reality is that the world, for now, continues to use the Intemet with
29 See generally id. (comparing the changing of our current TLD system with the practice of
reassigning area codes).
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the ever-familiar <.com> and company name. The ACPA and UDRP
may not be the definitive answer to domain name infringement, but
they serve and function as a monumental step in an area of the law
that is sure to grow exponentially in years to come.

